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• 
I. THE DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
The greatest progress in the defence of human rights at international 
level has been made since the end of the Second World War. The intention 
of introducing new international legal provisions requiring states to 
respect human rights reflected the deeper level of democratic maturity 
created by past experience. 
Two international organizations in particular, the United Nations 
and the Council of Europe, deserve credit for ensuring a substantial 
improvement in the protection of human rights at international level. 
Other organizations at continental level, such as the Organization of 
American States (OAS), or at regional level, such as the Arab league, 
have also contributed towards this end. 
(a) UN 
The policy of the United Nations, which dates from 1947, of ensuring 
the protection of human rights through international provisions w~s 
based from the outset on the principles embodied in the UN Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN on 
10 December 1948. 
Thanks to the unceasing efforts of the UN Human Rights Committee, 
on 16 December 1966 the UN General Assembly was able to adopt - after 
innumerable debates - Resolution No. 2200, to which are attached the 
two International Covenants oq Civil and Political Rights and Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
The two international Covenants are now an integral part of the 
international legal system. The Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights came into fore~ on 3 January 1976, and that on Civil and 
Political Rights on 23 March 1976. 
The Council of Europe has ensured compliance in Europe with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Xations and 
was responsible for the adoption of the European Convention for t~e 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
This Convention, signed in Rome on 4 November 1952, transformed a 
whole series of principles proclaimed by the United Nations into ~egal 
obligations safeguarding fundamental civil and political rights and 
human freedoms. 
In addition, the European Social Charter, adopted by the Council of 
Europe in 1961, is designed to protect economic and social rights in the 
light of the new requirements of contemporary society. 
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights does not 
merely lay down rules. It also sets up an institutional mechanism 
consisting of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European 
court of Human Rights. 
Both these institutions are responsible for ensuring the respect of 
the rights recognized and safeguarded by the Convention. On the whole, 
the European system for the protection of human rights is more complete 
than that introduced at international level by the United Nations. 
The 1967 review of the Charter of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) confirmed the protection of human rights on the American continent 
and provided for the setting up of an Inter-American Committee on 
Human Rights with appropriate jurisdiction. However, this jurisdiction. 
has not yet been introduced. 
In addition, in 1968 the Council of the Arab League set up a permanent 
Arab Commission on Human Rights in which all members of the Arab League 
are represented. Up to now, the Permanent Arab Commission has confined 
its investigations of respect for human rights to the Arab territories 
occupied by Israel. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
The defence of human rights at international level, as the 
practical result of relations between States, is still hampered today by 
the fact that almost all States continue to consider any question relating 
to the rights of their nationals as the exclusive responsibility of the 
respective national authorities. 
Furthermore, the UN Charter itself would seem to provide a perfect 
legal basis for this attitude. Article 2(7) of the Charter stipulates 
that : 
'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the 
dc.mestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters 
to settlement under the present Charter'. 
The problem of compatibility of the defence of human rights at 
international level with respect for national sovereignty was particularly 
evident on two separate occasions which illustrate the evolution of the 
situation, The first occasion was the negotiations for the conclusion of 
the above-mentioned European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. The second was the Belgrade follow-up Conference 
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from October 1977 to March 1978 on the implementation of the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in 
Helsinki on 1 August 1975. 
Certain European states expressed serious reservations, before the 
conclusion of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 
on the desirability of setting up an international legal body specifically 
for the protection of the rights of the individual. This negative attitude 
was based on the argument that such a legal body would be unable effectively 
to perform its function without intervening in the internal affairs of 
the states accused of violating rights. 
These objections led to a substantial limitation of the powers of 
the European court of Human Rights. This Court delivers rulings solely 
on cases referred to it by the European Commission of Human Rights or by 
states, and may not be approached directly by individual citizens. 
With regard to the application of the Helsinki Final Act, there has 
also been an attempt to ensure minimum encroachment upon the principle 
of national sovereignty. 
At the end of Principle VII of Basket I, the Act refers to the 
abovementioned two international Covenants attached to UN Resolution 
No. 2200 in the following terms: 
'In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the participating States will act in conformity with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. They will also fulfil their obligations 
as set forth in the international delcarations and 
agreements in this field. including inter alia the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they 
may be bound. ' 
Artificial justification of failure to comply with these international 
Covenants is tnus drawn from the wording of the provisions contained 
therein. For example, as regards economic, social and cultural rights, 
Article 4 of the relevant Covenant sanctions their restriction wherever 
this may be necessary in order to promote the general well-being of a 
democratic society. As regards civil and political rights, cases in 
which they may be restricted under the relevant Covenant are bound up 
with questions of national security, public order, public health and 
morals etc. 
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This restrictive view of the means available for the recording, 
condemnation and elimination of violations of human rights within the 
sphere of national sovereignty is in line with the traditional principle 
o£ non-interference in the internal affairs of states embodied in 
international law. 
However, within the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the principle of non-interference is evolving towards acceptance of the 
legality of action by another state or international organization in the 
defence of such rights. 
III. THE P~NCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The principle of non-interference, as referred to in Article 2(7) 
of the UN Charter, was reaffirmed in Principle VI of Basket I of the 
Helsinki Final Act. 
It is worth examining to what extent this principle may be invoked, 
in cases involving the violation of human rights, by signatory states 
of international agreements designed to protect such rights. 
Principle VI of Basket 1 of the Helsinki Final Act stipulates that: 
'The participating States will refrain from any 
intervention, direct or indirect, individual or 
collective, in ·the internal or external affairs 
falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another 
participating State, regardless of their mutual 
relations'. 
In short, therefore, the non-interference clause figures in 
international conventions and acts of fundamental importance for mankind 
- namely the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. 
Since 1946 the provisions of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter have 
been invoked on numeortrns questions submitted to the UN General Assembly or 
Security Council. However, these two UN bodies have always interpreted 
this provision restrictively by affirming that it precludes 'intervention', 
in other words any action which aims at imposing a specific line of 
conduct, although it does not prevent the initiation of a 'debate' which 
may be followed by a recommendation. Furthermore, these two bodies 
always reserve the right to establish, for each individual case, whether 
the matter concerned effectively falls within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the state in question. 
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This attitude of the UN General Assembly and Security Council does 
not conflict with the principles of existing international law. The 
extension of international law to matters concerning human rights, 
colonial exploitation and the maintenance of peace is undeniable. It 
has therefore been evident to the two UN bodies that such matters have 
now been removed from the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states. 
This situation - or legal nicety - must be recognized by law. 
The effective scope of th~ clauses contained in Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter and Principle VI of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act should 
be interpreted under international law. The International Court of Justice 
should stipulate the limits of the non-interference clause with regard 
to the protection of ~uman rights and the extent to which states may take 
refuge behind this clause to exampt themselves from obligations at 
international level. 
While making due allowance for the fundamental differences between 
the European Community and the United Nations, a certain similarity may 
be perceived between the interpretation given by the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities to the concept of 'public security' in the 
Community Member States and that of the UN. 
The concept of public security, which is referred to in Article 48 
of the EEC Treaty, is interpreted by some Member States as implying a 
virtually unlimited discretionary power on their own territory, with 
consequently negative repercussions for the freedom of ~ovement of workers. 
In its pecision of 28 October 19751, as confirmed by subsequent rulings, 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities described the limits of 
the power of action of the authorities of the Member Sta~es responsible 
for the protection of public order, in cases where such action constitutes 
a violation of the principle of free movement of workers laid down in the 
Treaty. 
-An analogous interpretation by the International Court of Justice of 
the scope of the non-interference clause with rega~d to the protection of 
human rights would help to fix the conditions under which the signatory 
states of international acts concerning such rights may legitimately 
invoke this clause. 
1case 36/75, Rutili, ECR 1975, p. 1230 
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A ruling by the International Court of Justice is also desirable 
from another point of view. Both Article 2(2) of the UN Charter and 
Principle X of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act expressly state that 
the parties must fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them 
under these international acts. 
The principle of good faith is directly derived from Article 26 of 
the Vienna Convention, pursuant to which the parties are bound by all 
existing treaties and must implement them in good faith. 
The principle of good faith thus constitutes a line of conduct 
which must be maintained by states in their international relations. 
There is no lack of legal decisions condemning the devious conduct of 
states wishing to escape obligations assumed under international agreements. 
Within the framework of international acts safeguarding human rights, 
the contracting states may not use their domestic jurisdiction as a 
pretext for barring intervention by other states designed to halt the 
unlawful violation of such acts. On the contrary, their attitude should 
be such as to ensure the effective fulfilment of the obligations which 
they have assumed. 
One further point should be mentioned concerning the compliance by 
states at international level, with the obligations which they have 
assumed concerning the protection of human rights. 
In performing its many different functions, the State may execute 
a number of different acts, which may be constitutional, legislative, 
administrative, legal or coercive. All these acts represent practical 
illustrations of its territorial sovereignty as legally recognized 
under international law. 
However, a law enacted by a state to be applied within its territory 
may conflict with international law, one rule of which is that actions 
implemented within a state must be considered unlawful at international 
level where they conflict with international agreements signed by that 
state. 
This principle, which has been upheld on several occasions under 
international law by the(Permanent Court of International Justice and the 
International Court of Justice), should remain valid when applied to conformity 
between the internal acts of states and international acts to which they 
are signatories in the field of human rights. 
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IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE 
Within the context of the European Co~~unity, the importance of the 
principle of non-interference, as traditionally understood in international 
law, has clearly diminished. 
The legal system of the Community, as defined by the Court of Justice, 
. 11 f' . 11 1 ~s a new ega system o ~nternat~ona aw . 
Within the territory of the Community, the Member States are subject 
to strict control to ensure that they comply with their obligations under 
the Treaties. This control is exercised by the Commission, the Community's 
executive body, and, at legal level, by the Court of Justice. 
In cases where the Commission considers that a Member State has failed 
to fulfil its obligations, it opens the infringement procedure provided 
for under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty. Under this procedure, the 
Commission (i.e. an international organ enjoying executive powers) may 
control the actions of a Member State within its own territory and, where 
appropriate, refer the matter to the Court of Justice. Once the matter is 
referred to the Court, its ruling is binding for the state in question. 
This means of action by an executive bo~y such as the Commission helps 
to ensure that Member States both comply with provisions of the EEC Treaty, 
and respect fundamental rights. This is an unprecedented example of 
voluntary acceptance by states of intervention by an external body responsible 
for examining their internal acts in the light of their international 
commitments. 
Although it does not contain a list of fundamental rights, the EEC 
Treaty contains numerous provisions concerning, directly or indirectly, the 
enjoyment of such rights (prohibiting of discrimination, principle of 
equality, freedom of establishment and to provide services etc.). It is 
clear, therefore that the failure to comply with one of these provisions 
by a Community Member State constitutes a violation not only of the 
provisions of the Treaty but of the fundamental rights safeguarded by 
those provisions. 
Nor should it be forgotten that, if we refer specifically to the 
protection of human rights at international level, the Community, which it 
itself signed the Helsinki Final Act, is not only formally committed to 
protecting those rights within its territory2 , but also endeavours to 
safeguard respect for such rights in the agreements which it concludes 
with Third countries or other international bodies. 
1
case 26/62, ECR 1963, p.23 
' 
2
see Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission, OJ No. 103, 27.4.1977 
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The most striking example concerns the current renewal of the 
Lome Convention, under which 55 developing countries are at present 
associated with the Community with a view to promoting their economic 
and social progress. The Community institutions have contemplated 
inserting, in the new text of the Convention, a clause expressly stating 
that the overriding objective of any economic and social cooperation is 
to serve mankind. 
Within this field of international relations, there is a growing 
tendency to provide for specific clauses compelling parties to respect 
human rights and, with regard to the protection of such rights, rendering 
invalid any reference to the concept of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
With the progressive.development of international law following the 
Second World War, the principles and rules governing the legal protection 
of human rights have been consolidated. 
International law has thus been extended to a sphere which had 
previously always been considered the sole concern of states and reflected 
the main features of the vai.ous legal and social systems. 
The State, therefore, no longer enjoys unlimited power of decision 
and action in exercising its sovereignty in cases where human rights are 
concerned. Certain restrictions have been placed on its jurisdiction in 
this field, reflecting theextentto which human rights are protected 
today at international level. 
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